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(Mandando un globo sonda: Una respuesta a Woodward acerca de asimetrías causales y 
explicativas) 
 




ABSTRACT: Does smoke cause fire or does fire cause smoke?  James Woodward’s “Flagpoles 
anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries” argues that various statistical independence 
relations not only help us to uncover the directions of causal and explanatory relations in our world, 
but also are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions.  We raise questions about 
Woodward’s envisioned epistemology, but our primary focus is on his metaphysics.  We argue 
that any alleged connection between statistical (in)dependence and causal/explanatory direction is 
contingent, at best.  The directions of causal/explanatory relations in our world seem not to depend 
on the statistical (in)dependence relations in our world (conceived of either as frequency patterns 
or as relations among chances).  Thus, we doubt that statistical (in)dependence relations are the 
worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions. 
 




RESUMEN: ¿El humo causa el fuego, o es el fuego el que causa el humo? James Woodward 
argumenta en “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries” que varias relaciones 
de independencia estadística no solo nos ayudan a descubrir la dirección de las relaciones 
causales y explicativas, sino que además constituyen el fundamento en el mundo de estas 
direcciones causales y explicativas. Aunque plantearemos preguntas acerca de la epistemología 
propuesta por Woodward, nos centraremos en su metafísica. Argumentaremos que cualquier 
supuesta conexión entre (in)dependencia estadística y dirección explicativa/causal es en el mejor 
de los casos contingente. La dirección de las relaciones causales/explicativas en nuestro mundo 
no parece depender de relaciones de (in)dependencia estadística en nuestro mundo (concebidas 
como patrones de frecuencia o como relaciones entre probabilidades). Por tanto, ponemos en 
duda que las relaciones de (in)dependencia estadística constituyan la base de las direcciones 
causales y explicativas.  
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SHORT SUMMARY: We challenge James Woodward’s recent claim that statistical independence 
relations are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory direction.  While statistical independence 
relations might be an excellent source of evidence about causal and explanatory direction, we 
doubt that these same independence relations make it the case that causal and explanatory relations 




We are always excited to see new work from James Woodward, including his recent article, 
“Flagpoles anyone?  Causal and explanatory asymmetries” (Woodward, 2020a).  In it, Woodward 
draws epistemological and metaphysical morals about causal and explanatory direction from 
recent work in statistics and machine learning.  Woodward’s is a fruitful strategy; he emphasizes 
the interesting and telling fact that experts reliably infer causal and hence explanatory directions 
(e.g., that fire causes and explains smoke but that smoke does not cause or explain fire) from three 
types of statistical independence relations.  Here we will ask a few questions about the precise 
nature of the connection between statistical independence and causal direction that Woodward 
envisions.  Along the way, we will share some of our own thoughts about the worldly 
underpinnings of causal and explanatory directedness.  
Woodward glosses his project as an attempt to “use [an interventionist framework] to try 
to illuminate some features of explanatory and causal asymmetries” (2020a, p. 4).  At least some 
of this light is meant to be cast on the epistemology of explanatory and causal directedness; 
Woodward introduces his topic with such questions as “Is there some way we can reliably infer, 
given other assumptions and perhaps information about other correlations… whether the causal 
direction is from X to Y or from Y to X?” (2020a, p. 3).  Much of Woodward’s paper describes 
techniques (drawn from breakthroughs in statistics and machine learning) for inferring whether X 
causes Y or Y causes X (when these are the only epistemically possible causal relations between 
variables X and Y).  The epistemological picture that emerges depicts relative frequencies, 
analyzed with statistical tools, as providing evidence about the truth of interventionist 
counterfactuals.   
In particular, Woodward holds that statistical independence is evidence of causal 
independence in at least three ways.  First, we should expect causally independent variables also 
to be statistically independent (CSI).  Second, we should expect causal laws to be independent of 
a system’s initial conditions (VRI).  Third, we should expect causal relationships to be independent 
of one another.  In addition, whenever some statistical relationships are evidence of causal 
relationships, those statistical relationships are also evidence of corresponding interventionist 
counterfactuals.       
What is the status of CSI, VRI, and the other putative facts (all of which Woodward 
introduces collectively as “G” (2020a, p. 5)) that Woodward says “we use to correctly infer causal 
and explanatory direction even if we have not performed the appropriate experimental 
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interventions” (2020a, p. 5)?  In discussing CSI, VRI, etc., Woodward makes the illuminating 
point that statistical independence relations play multiple important roles in the epistemology of 
causal and explanatory direction.  We were fascinated to read his descriptions of new techniques 
for uncovering causal direction from statistical information.  However, Woodward also seems to 
assign a (more controversial) role to these putative facts.  He says that they are “more than ‘mere 
heuristics’ for inferring causal direction” (2020a, p. 6).  VRI, for instance, “is not merely a 
superficial symptom that happens to be associated with causal direction” (2020a, p. 41).   
That had better be the case, it seems to us, in order for Woodward to be correct in taking 
himself to be in conversation with pragmatist philosophers who think that “the directional features 
we ascribe to explanations and causal claims have their source in facts about human psychology” 
(2020a, p. 11).  Against this view, Woodward aims to reply by showing that “there are procedures 
that reliably identify causal direction and that make use of information about how matters stand in 
the world, rather than information about our interests or about human psychology” (2020a, p. 11).  
This strategy for replying to the pragmatists depends (it seems to us) on taking CSI, VRI, etc., to 
be facts about what causal relations are, not merely about how we ascertain them.  After all, the 
pragmatists (according to whom it is we who give causation and explanation their directedness) 
can fully recognize that objective facts about statistical (in)dependence relations track our 
judgments of causal directedness. The pragmatists can be rebutted only by showing that 
explanatory and causal directedness consist wholly in facts that are independent of our psychology.  
Showing that explanatory or causal directedness can be ascertained from facts that are independent 
of our psychology will not suffice. 
Of course, a thoroughgoing empiricist about causal relations will deny even that we are 
entitled to use CSI, VRI, etc., to ascertain facts about causal direction, insofar as facts about causal 
direction have modal import (as the interventionist takes them to have). Just as one cannot 
undermine inductive skepticism by pointing out that evidence concerning the past tracks our 
common-sense expectations about the future, so likewise one cannot undermine the thoroughgoing 
empiricist about causal relations by pointing out that evidence about what actually happens (that 
is, about relative frequencies, statistical independence, and the like) tracks our common-sense 
expectations about what would have happened had things been different.  The inductive skeptic 
demands to know how it could be that the past is evidence for the future; likewise, the empiricist 
demands to know how it could be that actual patterns are evidence of counterfactual patterns.  
For example, here is a representative passage in which Woodward connects statistical 
independence to interventionist counterfactuals:  “Similarly, looking at the matter from an 
interventionist perspective, if, as we are assuming, the only two possibilities are that X and some 
U cause Y or that Y and some U` cause X, the existence of a U which is independent of X but not 
independent of Y strongly suggests that one can intervene on Y (by using U) without changing X, 
which is diagnostic of the absence of a causal relationship from Y to X” (2020a, p. 34) (our italics). 
The empiricist demands to know why what actually happens “strongly suggests” anything at all 
about what would have happened, had various things been different. This may be a question that 
Woodward is simply not aiming to address. 
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There may be others in the same neighborhood. There are many ways in which each 
epistemic agent ascertains explanatory and causal relations. Testimony is obviously one way. (Our 
parents told us that fire causes smoke whereas smoke does not cause fire.) But the content of the 
testimony we receive is presumably a “merely superficial symptom” of causal directedness. It 
presupposes other, more direct ways of making these discoveries. In denying that CSI, VRI, etc., 
are similarly superficial symptoms, Woodward is presumably indicating that there is something 
deeper about the evidentiary relationship between statistical (in)dependence and explanatory or 
causal relations than there is about the evidentiary relationship between testimony (for instance) 
and explanatory or causal relations.  
This leaves open several options. One option is that statistical (in)dependence relations are 
direct evidence regarding causal relations, from which (in turn) we should infer interventionist 
counterfactuals. Another option is that statistical (in)dependence relations are direct evidence 
regarding interventionist counterfactuals, from which (in turn) we should infer causal judgements.  
Another option is that statistical (in)dependence relations are direct evidence regarding some 
additional features of the world (such as laws or dispositions) that are metaphysically or 
conceptually linked to both causal relations and interventionist counterfactuals. That the 
evidentiary relationship between statistical (in)dependence and explanatory or causal relations is 
prior to the evidentiary relationship between testimony (for instance) and explanatory or causal 
relations seems compatible with all of these options.  These epistemological questions about causal 
directedness are enlivened but not directly addressed by Woodward’s paper.    
Let’s now consider what is supposed to enable CSI, VRI, etc., to underwrite reliable 
inferences to causal relations.  Sometimes it seems as if Woodward regards CSI, VRI, etc. as 
playing their epistemic roles because of the considerations that make one potential scientific 
explanation better (in the sense of “inference to the best explanation”) than another.  For instance, 
Woodward regards CSI as connected to “the explanatory virtue of avoiding unexplained 
coincidences” (2020a, p. 32) and refers to models with unexplained coincidences as “deficient qua 
explanations” (2020a, p. 29).  However, Woodward seems to believe that there are deeper reasons 
why facts such as CSI play their epistemic roles.  VRI, for instance, is intended to tie into 
Woodward’s interventionist/manipulationist account of what causal relations are (a simple version 
of which is given as (M) on (2020a, p. 3)); VRI says roughly that the laws would still have held 
under twiddles of the causal variables, and that invariance is why “we can use manipulation of X 
and the X à Y relationship as a way of changing Y” (2020a, p. 41).  So the origins of VRI and its 
colleagues are supposed to lie pretty deep.1 
 
1 VRI also seems to tie into what laws of nature are (according to Woodward), namely, facts that have a broad range 
of invariance under certain sorts of counterfactual twiddles (Woodward, 2000b). In this respect, Woodward’s view 
of laws is roughly similar to Lange’s (2009), though Woodward (2000b, pp. 1912-3) takes pains to point out the 
differences that (he says) make his view superior. The chief difference he emphasizes is that his account requires 
that laws remain invariant only under counterfactual twiddles made by interventions, whereas Lange imposes no 
such limitation and so implausibly (Woodward says) requires laws to be invariant even under a “counterfactual 
under which we consider whether it is reasonable to infer the truth of the consequent given the supposition of the 
 
 5 
 How deep is unclear.  At times, Woodward seems explicit that statistical (in)dependence 
relations are evidence of causal and explanatory relations in virtue of their metaphysical 
connection to causal and explanatory relations. For example, Woodward is critical of metaphysical 
accounts on which causal directedness is derived from causal laws, such as those found in 
Davidson (1967) and Armstrong (1997).  He argues that we need not look to causal  
laws to find a worldly source of causal direction, since causal direction is instead based in statistical 
(in)dependence relations combined with facts such as VRI and CSI: 
 
[M]y contrary suggestion is that the basis for the directional features of causation is to be 
found in facts about initial and boundary conditions characterizing the systems we are 
analyzing and how these relate to (or interact with) laws and c-generalizations.  At least 
some of these facts are captured by conditions like VRI and CSI.  Arguably these conditions 
involve straightforwardly “objective” facts that describe how matters stand in the world… 
(2020a, pp. 43-4) 
 
Woodward’s observations about VRI and CSI could bear on whether laws have causal directedness 
“built in”, so to speak, only if Woodward were making a metaphysical claim about what causal 
directedness consists in.   
Let’s now consider what is supposed to explain the truth of VRI, CSI, and the other 
components of G.  Presumably, their truth depends on something to do with what causation and 
explanation are. Yet Woodward resists characterizing his project as metaphysical: 
 
 
antecedent.” Lange (2009, pp. 198-200), however, discusses these sorts of potential counterexamples to his view and 
argues that they involve indicative conditionals, not counterfactual conditionals. Counterfactuals, he says, concern 
whether the consequent would have been true under the antecedent, not whether it is reasonable to infer the truth of 
the consequent having been told the antecedent’s truth. One important difference between Lange’s view and 
Woodward’s is that Woodward’s treats laws one-by-one, deeming that a given law must have a broad range of 
invariance. Lange, by contrast, considers the laws collectively, not individually; a law’s lawhood (and natural 
necessity) is a team effort, not an individual achievement. He argues that what distinguishes a law (as far as its 
invariance under counterfactual antecedents is concerned) is not that it has a broader range of invariance than an 
accident, but that the laws collectively have as broad of a range of invariance as they could collectively have. 
Lange’s view therefore permits counterfactual antecedents under which a given accident would still have held, but a 
given law would not still have held (Lange, 2009, pp. 12-13). Lange’s view also allows that one actual law would 
(or, at least, might) have been violated, had some other actual law (with which it stands in no logical relationship) 
been violated. For instance, had one fundamental kind of physical interaction violated one of the great symmetry 
principles or conservation laws, then (with that constraint out of the way) some other fundamental kind of 
interaction might have done so, too. Of course, this is not a counterfactual twiddle made by an intervention. By 
going beyond counterfactual twiddles made by interventions, Lange (2009) purports to account for the sense 
(according, e.g., to Wigner) in which certain laws (such as the spacetime symmetry principles and the great 
conservation laws) transcend other laws (such as the various force laws): the symmetry principles and conservation 
laws would still have obtained, had there been additional kinds of forces.  
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I said above that the supporting features G are ordinary empirical features of our world.  I 
believe, as an empirical matter, that they are present in many systems in our world but 
nothing guarantees that they are always present.  Still less will these features be present in 
all logically possible worlds:  their presence is not a matter of conceptual truth.  One 
consequence is that my discussion of causal direction is not intended to apply to worlds 
that are wildly different from our own:  For example, I will not attempt to capture 
“intuitions” some may have about what causal direction amounts to in universes that 
contain just two particles.  Again, to the extent that a metaphysics of causal direction 
attempts to address questions about what causal direction consists of in all possible worlds 
this is not my project.  (2020a, p. 8) 
 
But if VRI, CSI, and the like are not built into what causal and explanatory relations are, then it 
remains unexplained why they obtain in our world (and so, in turn, it remains unexplained why 
are they so epistemically useful). Furthermore, if there is directionality without VRI, etc., in some 
possible worlds, then why is directionality based on VRI, etc., in the actual world?  If there is 
directionality without VRI, etc., in some possible worlds, then why isn’t the “basis” of 
directionality in those worlds available to be its basis in the actual world? 
 Woodward says, “I don’t think of the ideas that follow as a contribution to the kind of 
metaphysics that purports to tell us what causation is” (2020a, p. 7). Yet he seems at least to 
entertain the possibility of their making such a contribution. (Their doing so would nicely short-
circuit questions like those we asked just above.) Expressing reluctance to incorporate CSI, etc., 
into what causal relations are, Woodward writes: 
 
Let me repeat that my claim is that CSI describes a generic pattern that, as a 
contingent empirical matter holds widely, if not universally, in our world. I do not claim 
that CSI reflects a conceptual or metaphysical truth of some kind that holds in “all 
possible worlds”. My assumption is that CSI and similar principles, although contingent, 
help to underpin the ways in which we think about causation and causal direction. (They 
are part of the infrastructure associated with causal direction mentioned earlier.) I will 
not speculate about how if at all one thinks about causal direction in worlds in which CSI 
is systematically violated (or which we might find it tempting to describe in that way). 
(2020a, p. 21)  
 
But what if CSI, etc., are violated? Is the directionality of causal relations then secured by some 
other means, rather than by facts like CSI, etc.? If CSI, etc., are metaphysically necessary for there 
to be causal relations, then the problem of what makes for causal relations’ directionality without 
CSI, etc., cannot arise.  
In a footnote to the above passage, Woodward seems to recognize this as a possible 
solution. Regarding “how if at all” (our emphasis) we should “think about causal direction in 
worlds in which CSI is systematically violated (or which we might find it tempting to describe in 
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that way),” Woodward writes: “Of course if the way in which we think about causation is not 
applicable to such cases, it presumably doesn’t make literal sense to describe them in terms of 
violations of CSI which is a claim about how causation, as we think about it, is connected to 
probability” (2020a, p. 21, fn. 32). If CSI, etc., are metaphysically or conceptually required by 
causal relations, then worlds that “we might find it tempting to describe” as violating CSI (i.e., as 
worlds where there are causal relations that are not connected to statistics in the manner required 
by CSI) are worlds without causal relations at all and so (trivially) satisfy CSI.  
 It seems like worlds could violate CSI.2 What this would require depends somewhat on 
how CSI is to be understood. CSI requires the statistical independence of causally independent 
variables. This seems to mean that for causally independent variables H and A, a given value of H 
is as frequently associated with one value of A as with any other. This is the way that statistical 
independence is elaborated in the flagpole case (where H is the height of the flagpole, A is the 
angle to the ground of the light source shining on the flagpole, and S is the length of the flagpole’s 
shadow on the ground):  
 
Suppose that we observe several flagpoles of different fixed heights h1…hn, at different 
times of day for each pole, so that A varies. In this case for any given A, there will be a 
correlation between the heights of the poles and the corresponding shadows of lengths 
s1…sn but no correlation between H and A. (2020a, p. 25) 
 
Statistical independence, then, seems to be purely a matter of frequencies – of lack of “correlation”. 
So understood, though, CSI would seem to preclude fluky, purely coincidental, unlikely 
correlations among causally independent variables. But Woodward says otherwise: “Note that 
[CSI] doesn’t mean that ‘coordinated’ behavior among independent causes on particular occasions 
is impossible; rather it means that the probability of this occurring is low, for the same reason that 
a long run of heads in a series of causally and statistically independent coin flips is possible but 
unlikely” (2020a, p. 20, fn. 29). We are not sure why CSI’s official statement permits such a fluke.  
Of course, there is a motivation to interpret CSI as permitting such a fluke. If such a fluke 
undermined CSI’s application to a given case, then causal directionality in that case could not 
depend on CSI. But the occurrence of such a fluke would presumably leave unaltered the usual 
directions of causal relationships. For instance, suppose that someone blew up various flagpoles 
over the course of a day in such a way that coincidentally, H and A for flagpoles when we observed 
them ended up being correlated. Then the directions of the causal relationships among H, S, and 
A would presumably be no different. But that directionality couldn’t then be based on CSI. This 
result suggests (at least to some degree) that even when CSI obtains, directionality isn’t based on 
CSI.   
 
2 Perhaps the same case cannot be made that some possible worlds violate VRI. See the previous note, which 
discusses the (seemingly metaphysically necessary) connection between lawhood and some special sort of 
invariance under counterfactual twiddles. 
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If CSI is interpreted as concerning objective chances rather than frequencies, then CSI 
permits such flukes; obviously, such a fluke correlation would not undermine the variables’ 
statistical independence understood in terms of their objective chances. Nevertheless, it seems 
(pretheoretically, at least) that there are possible worlds where CSI (in terms of chances) is violated 
(not because of some fluke correlation – which, as just noted, wouldn’t be enough to violate it) 
and yet causal directionality obtains in its usual way, presumably for its usual reasons. Presumably 
as well, this is precisely the sort of “intuition” about “worlds that are wildly different from ours” 
that Woodward disparages in a passage quoted above and says that he is not trying to capture. But 
if causal directionality is maintained in such worlds even without CSI (let’s say), then doesn’t that 
fact potentially count (at least to some degree) against CSI’s being crucial to causal directionality 
in the actual world?  
There are doubtless more compelling examples where CSI (as so interpreted) fails, but a 
simple one might consist of a possible world where there are two kinds of particles (p-ons and q-
ons). There are laws giving each particle’s effects on the trajectories of other particles near it. For 
a given special location, there is a law specifying the chance that a p-on will spontaneously come 
into existence there at the end of each ten-second interval (starting now…). There is another law 
specifying the chance that a q-on will spontaneously come into existence at another special 
location at that same moment. By these laws, these chances vary for different intervals, but the p-
on chance and q-on chance are correlated. These two potential causes (the popping into existence 
of a p-on and the popping into existence of a q-on at the two special locations) are thus causally 
independent but statistically dependent. The causal directionality of the effects of these particles 
seems unaffected by this violation of CSI.3 
It thus does not seem plausible to us that the worldly basis of causal and explanatory 
directionality is to be found in statistical relations or relations among chances. In fact, perhaps a 
genuine interventionist ought to resist locating the worldly basis of causal and explanatory 
directionality in statistical relations (or relations among chances), VRI, and G’s other components.  
For an interventionist, the worldly source of causal and explanatory directionality should be 
whatever makes true the relevant interventionist counterfactuals. What makes it the case that fire 
causes smoke but smoke does not cause fire, for example, should be whatever makes it the case 
that intervening on fire’s presence would make a difference to smoke’s presence but not vice versa. 
Woodward astutely makes this point himself but goes on to worry that an interventionist treatment 
of causal directedness will be unsatisfying because “the notion of an intervention is of course itself 
a causal notion and as such has a notion of causal direction built into it” (2020a, p. 6). We agree 
that that is a concern. But we wonder whether this concern can be plausibly met by tying causal 
directedness to (at best) contingent facts such as VRI and CSI. Just as causal and explanatory 
directionality seem unaffected by violations of CSI, so too the truth-values of the relevant 
interventionist counterfactuals seem unaffected by violations of CSI.  
 
3 Our debt to Sober (2001) here should be obvious. 
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Woodward’s paper concludes by considering the Königsberg bridge example. Euler 
arguably explained why no one ever succeeded (or, in particular, why a given person never 
succeeded) in crossing all of the bridges of Königsberg (as they were arranged in 1735) exactly 
once (while remaining always on land or on a bridge rather than in a boat, for instance, and so 
forth). Euler discovered that a network is “traversible” in this sense if and only either every vertex 
or every vertex but two is touched by an even number of edges. (Any successful bridge-traverser 
would have to enter a given vertex exactly as many times as she leaves it, unless the vertex is the 
start or the end of her trip. So among the vertices, either none (if the trip starts and ends at the same 
vertex) or two could touch an odd number of edges.) Arguably, then, the reason why no one ever 
succeeded at traversing the Königsberg bridges is that this arrangement of bridges possesses a 
certain graph-theoretic feature. Woodward is concerned with the directionality of this putative non-
causal explanation of the bridge arrangement’s non-traversibility by the bridge arrangement’s 
possessing the graph-theoretic feature that Euler uncovered. In particular, an explanation runs from 
the arrangement’s graph-theoretic feature to the arrangement’s non-traversibility, but not in the 
reverse direction.  
The discussion in Woodward’s paper (2020a, pp. 49-50) appears to focus exclusively on 
what justifies our belief regarding this directionality (e.g., “this two explanation story…was less 
plausible”, “it is reasonable to conclude…”, “in the absence of some further explanation of these 
dependencies, we should infer that the direction…”, etc.). His idea is that “the intentions and 
behavior of those who constructed the bridges” (2020a, p. 49) caused the graph-theoretic feature.  
Therefore, for the bridges’ non-traversibility also to explain (non-causally) the graph-theoretic 
feature would involve the graph-theoretic feature’s implausibly having two explanations, where 
the two explainers (the builders’ intentions/behavior and the arrangement’s non-traversibility) 
“just happen to be correlated even though no explanation is provided for this fact” (2020a, p. 50). 
However, an interventionist treatment of causation seems to imply that the intentions and 
behavior of the builders caused the bridges to be arranged so as to possess Euler’s graph-theoretic 
feature and caused the bridges to be non-traversible. The graph-theoretic feature and the non-
traversibility stand and fall together, by necessity. So if interventions on the intentions/behavior of 
the builders are associated with changes in whether the bridge’s arrangement has Euler’s graph-
theoretic feature, then these same interventions are also associated with changes in whether the 
bridge arrangement is traversible. Thus, whether the graph-theoretic feature (non-causally) 
explains the non-traversibility or the non-traversibility explains the graph-theoretic feature, we 
will have both a non-causal and causal explanation of one of the bridge arrangement’s features. 
Furthermore, whichever way the non-causal explanation runs, we will not have any unexplained 
correlations on our hands. Both the non-traversibility and the graph-theoretic feature are correlated 
with the intentions/behaviors of the builders, and the intentions/behaviors of the builders also 
causally explains both the non-traversibility and the graph-theoretic feature. 
But let’s set the above worry aside since these all appear to be epistemic matters; they do 
not obviously concern what makes the bridges’ non-traversibility explained (non-causally) by the 
arrangement’s graph-theoretic feature rather than the reverse. That certain considerations justify 
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our belief about the directionality fails to show that “this directionality could be understood” 
(2020a, p. 49) in terms of these considerations. In other words, even if “the putative explanation 
of E [the graph-theoretic feature] in terms of T [non-traversibility] seems redundant and 
superfluous [both!], given the availability of an explanation [of E] in terms of X [the 
intentions/behavior]” (2020a, p. 50, fn. 72), we doubt whether that redundancy is what makes it 
false that non-traversibility non-causally explains the arrangement’s graph-theoretic feature.4  
Rather, the existence of a causal explanation (appealing to the builders’ 
intentions/behavior) of the bridge arrangement’s graph-theoretic feature may play solely an 
epistemic role: of helping justly to persuade us that non-traversibility fails to non-causally explain 
the arrangement’s graph-theoretic feature. Indeed most accounts of scientific explanation regard a 
given candidate as qualifying or not as a genuine explanation for reasons having nothing to do 
with what other explanations there happen to be.5  
As an illustration, here is an example (from Lange, 2019) that involves precisely the 
relation between causal and non-causal explanations. Consider a rocket (feeling negligible 
gravitational influences) consisting primarily of a chamber filled with gas that can serve as fuel, a 
mechanism for igniting the gas (suddenly increasing its temperature and pressure), and a valve on 
the left side of the chamber (that is, a wall that can be removed by some means requiring negligible 
force and making negligible contribution to the system’s momentum). Suppose that the rocket is 
initially at rest and then the gas is ignited. The rocket remains at rest with the high-pressure gas 
inside until the valve is opened. When that happens, gas escapes to the left as exhaust while the 
rocket accelerates to the right.  
A genuine explanation of the rocket’s acceleration to the right, when the valve on the left 
is opened, is causal-mechanical: with the valve opened, the gas molecules in the rocket exert 
greater force on the right-hand wall than on the left-hand wall, since the valve on the left is open 
so there is less wall on the left than on the right for the gas to hit. The internal force is therefore 
unbalanced, pushing the rocket to the right. One might be tempted to think that there is also a non-
causal, momentum-conservation-law explanation of the rocket’s rightward acceleration: the 
exhaust has leftward momentum, so momentum conservation requires that the rocket have 
rightward momentum. Lange (2019) argues that this momentum-conservation argument is not in 
fact explanatory – at least, not for the very same explanandum as the causal-mechanical 
explanation targets (namely, the fact that the rocket accelerates to the right, rather than remaining 
at rest or accelerating to the left). But (on Lange’s view) it is not the existence of the causal-
 
4 For that matter, why doesn’t the same argument apply to the putatively correct direction of non-causal 
explanation? Why doesn’t the putative explanation of the arrangement’s non-traversibility by the arrangement’s 
graph-theoretic feature seem redundant given the availability of an explanation of the arrangement’s non-
traversibility by the builders’ intentions/behavior? 
5 Kitcher’s (1989) account is a notable exception. On his view, an argument’s status as an explanation depends on its 
argument pattern earning its way into the explanatory store, which depends on its covering explananda that have not 
already been covered by the store’s members (or its covering explananda that have already been covered by the 
store’s members, but covering them in a more stringent way, or…). 
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mechanical explanation that makes the momentum-conservation argument non-explanatory. 
Rather, what makes the momentum-conservation argument non-explanatory is that it would have 
to use the exhaust’s accelerating leftward as part of what explains the rocket’s accelerating 
rightward, but there is nothing to make the exhaust’s moving to the left explanatorily prior to the 
rocket’s moving to the right. (Nor does anything make the reverse qualify as the order of 
explanatory priority.)  
The same applies in the case of the bridges. For their non-traversibility to explain their 
possessing a certain graph-theoretic feature (or vice versa), some consideration relevant to non-
causal explanatory priority would have to make non-traversibility explanatorily prior to the graph-
theoretic feature (or vice versa). Whether some such consideration exists would seem to have 
nothing to do with whether there is a causal explanation of the graph-theoretic feature (or the non-
traversibility). 
To conclude: Woodward’s paper paints an interesting and attractive picture of the 
epistemology of causal and explanatory direction.  We would be interested to hear even more, such 
as how Woodward thinks interventionists should address skeptical empiricist challenges about 
counterfactuals or what separates the epistemological role of CSI, VRI, etc., from comparatively 
superficial symptoms of causal relations (e.g., testimony).  Turning to Woodward’s more 
metaphysical inquiries, we doubt that explanatory and causal relations owe their directionality to 
the kinds of statistical patterns or relations among chances that Woodward identifies.  But we 
readily admit that we may have missed Woodward’s point in this portion of his discussion.  He 
emphasizes that his project should be interpreted neither merely as epistemology nor as 
metaphysics in the sense that many philosophers understand it.  He says that it is instead associated 
with “minimal metaphysics” (2020a, p. 6, fn.8).  We look forward very much to hearing more 
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